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Abstract: The following report is an investigation of growth strategies for charter 
management organizations. The report begins with an overview of the School Choice 
Movement and its introduction of market forces into the public education system. 
Drawing from the private, nonprofit and education sectors, the report introduces three 
existing frameworks for organizational growth and new market entry. The report 
evaluates the robustness of each of these frameworks as well as their applicability to 
charter school expansion through the lens of a case-study investigation of IDEA Public 
Schools’ expansion from the Rio Grande Valley to the Austin, Texas education market. 
The report concludes by introducing a new, cross-sector framework for charter expansion 
that brings together the strengths of existing models as well as the lessons learned from 
the IDEA case. The framework consists of four phases: pre-expansion, geographic 
market selection, growth mechanism selection and implementation.  
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Chapter 1: The School Choice Movement 
While the concept of school reform is not new in the United States, it is now, as it 
has been in the past, a hotly debated and divisive issue that evokes as much emotion as it 
does critical examination. A current wave of reform, known as the School Choice 
Movement, is no exception. This approach to reform calls into question the compatibility 
of several core American values, heightening the sensitivities of Americans across the 
political spectrum. On the one hand, a tradition of support for the public education system 
reflects values of equality, equity and universal opportunity.1 Meanwhile a second 
tradition – one of honoring local autonomy and supporting the innovation and enterprise 
of the individual – is similarly cherished in the American tradition. These two core values 
come into conflict in the discussion surrounding school choice, a reform model which 
introduces competition into local education markets through policies that support school 
vouchers, education tax credits and/or charter schools.  
DEFINING CONTEMPORARY SCHOOL CHOICE 
 There is ample historical precedent for American parents taking a proactive role 
in selecting a preferred school environment for their children. Many parents have 
exercised forms of school choice for decades, even centuries. One of the earliest such 
examples is that of circumventing the local public school in favor of a private or 
parochial school. Another common form of school choice is selecting a school through 
choice of residence—opting to live within the district boundaries of a preferred school or 
district.  A third, more contemporary version of school choice is homeschooling. Notably, 
each of these early approaches to exercising school choice places a high burden, in 
                                                
1 Cooper and Randall, “Fear and Privatization,” 205. 
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particular, a financial burden, on parents. In “Reevaluating the Politics and Research of 
School Choice,” Aaron Cooley offers a helpful working definition of school choice in the 
contemporary era: “Essentially, school choice means altering the governance and funding 
of the present K–12 public education system to allow parents and students to select the 
educational institutions that best fit their needs.”2 Key to distinguishing the contemporary 
school choice movement from its roots is this idea of altered funding structures. By 
allowing parents to access public funding to support their choice, the contemporary 
movement of school choice is, in theory, meant to be inclusive of all socioeconomic 
strata.  
There have been two primary mechanisms for introducing school choice into 
educational markets in the last three decades. The first is offering a form of financial 
transfers through tax credits, tax deductions or school vouchers. The second is through 
legislation that permits the opening of charter schools.  
Financial Transfers 
Financial transfers are designed to reallocate purchasing power to parents when it 
comes to education. School vouchers offer parents a “coupon” toward purchasing 
educational services, enabling them (depending on local legislation) to purchase a space 
at another public school or to apply their allotment of public funding toward tuition at a 
private or parochial school. School choice tax structures offer parents the opportunity to 
pay less in taxes to offset money spent on school for their children.3 Financial transfers 
are often perceived as an extreme approach to introducing school choice, because they 
allow parents to withdraw funds from the public school system altogether. Perhaps, for 
this reason, they have been slow to take off and comprise a relatively small portion of the 
                                                
2 Cooley, “Reevaluating the Politics and Research of School Choice,” 246. 
3 Ibid., 251. 
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school choice movement.4 Currently 17 states offer some sort of voucher program, 
compared with 41 states who have passed legislation allowing for charter schools.5 
Charter Schools 
Receiving broader public and legislative support across the country, (and of 
particular focus in this report) are charter schools. Funding and regulation of these 
schools is determined by each state individually but, broadly defined, charter schools are 
semi-autonomous public schools that receive less in public funding than district schools, 
but more procedural and curricular freedom to promote student achievement in 
innovative ways.6 In “Fear and Privatization,” charter schools are described by Bruce 
Cooper and Vance Randall as a “public-private hybrid.”7 Charters compete with public 
schools and draw from public funds. They receive a per-pupil allotment of public funding 
for each student they serve, but receive no facilities funding from the state. They can (and 
generally must) supplement their revenue through alternative sources such as donations 
and grants from private foundations. In “compensation” for reduced public funding, 
charter schools are allowed greater autonomy from the typical restrictions faced by public 
schools. They are free to implement innovative curricula, management and operational 
practices. In “Charters ‘Yes!’ Vouchers ‘No!’” Joe Nathan identifies several common 
features of charter schools, deriving from the first charter law passed in Minnesota in 
1992:  
 
• The state will give more than one publicly accountable organization the power 
to authorize or sponsor new kinds of public schools. That could include the 
                                                
4 Viteritti, Walberg, and Wolf, “School Choice,” 143. 
5 Santos and Rich, “States Redefining Public Schooling.” 
6 “Executive Summary--Evaluation of the Public Charter Schools Program.” 
7 Cooper and Randall, “Fear and Privatization,” 216. 
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State Board of Education, local school boards, cities, universities, foundations, 
major non-profit organizations, etc.  
• Those sponsors will develop a "charter" or contract with a group of people 
who want to create a new kind of public school, or want to convert an existing 
public school to something new.  
• The contract will specify improvements in student achievement that the school 
will have to produce in order to have its contract renewed.  
• The school will be public. It will be nonsectarian. It will not charge tuition. It 
will not have admissions tests of any kind. It will follow health and safety 
regulations. 
• Existing public schools may convert to charter status. That should happen if a 
majority of the teachers in the school vote to convert. 
• The state will offer an up-front waiver of rules about curriculum, 
management, and teaching. The state may specify student outcomes, but 
determining how the school operates should be up to the people who establish 
and operate it. The charter school concept trades bureaucracy for 
accountability, regulation for results. 
• The charter school will be a school of choice. Faculty, students, and families 
actively choose it. No one is assigned to be there. 
• The school will become a discrete entity: The law may let the founders choose 
any organization available under general state law or may specify an 
organization, such as non-profit. As a legal entity, the school will have its 
board. There is real site management. Teachers, if employees, have full rights 
to organize and bargain collectively; however, their bargaining unit is separate 
from any district bargaining unit.  
• The full per-pupil allocation will move with the student. That amount should 
be roughly the average state allocation per pupil or the average in the district 
from which the student comes. If the state provides extra funds for students 
from low-income families or with disabilities, those funds also should follow 
the students. 
• Participating teachers should be protected and given new opportunities. To 
teach in charter schools, teachers may take leaves from public school systems, 
and while on leave will retain their seniority. They may continue to participate 
in the local or state retirement programs. New teachers may join state 
retirement programs. They may choose to be employees, or to organize a 
professional group under which they collectively own and operate the school.8 
                                                
8 Nathan, “Charters‘ Yes!’ Vouchers‘ No!’ Parental Choice and Excellence,” 113. 
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MARKET FORCES IN EDUCATION 
The origin of school choice theory is widely attributed to economist and Nobel 
laureate Milton Friedman. His 1955 article, “The Role of Government in Education” 
advocated for a market-based education system, which would rely on a sort of voucher 
system. Friedman writes, “Given, as at present, that parents can send their children to 
government schools with out special payment, very few can or will send them to other 
schools unless they too are subsidized… Let the subsidy be made available to parents 
regardless where they send their children—provided it be to schools that satisfy specified 
minimum standards—and a wide variety of schools will spring up to meet the demand.”9 
As Joseph Viteritti explains in “School Choice: How an Abstract Idea Became a Political 
Reality,” the idea was radical at the time, and the article addressed to an audience of 
economists, so it did not take hold immediately. Friedman reintroduced the idea in 1980 
and his second article, “Free to Choose: A Personal Statement,” took a political rather 
than theoretical approach; this time he had a ready ear in the White House, with Ronald 
Reagan in office.10 Reagan took the first initiatives to move school choice forward 
politically, submitting three separate voucher bills to congress. Each of these bills failed 
to gain traction, given a general mistrust of the new and unfamiliar idea.  However, 
Reagan’s political action sparked debate and laid the groundwork for future research and 
advocacy of school choice.11 
In 1990, John Chubb and Terry Moe published Politics, Markets, and America’s 
Schools. In the book, they reanalyze data from a survey that had shown private schools 
outperforming public schools (Coleman, Hoffman and Kilgore, 1982) and use the data to 
give credence to Friedman’s economic theory. They engage in a thorough critique of the 
                                                
9 Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, 6. 
10 Viteritti, Walberg, and Wolf, “School Choice,” 139. 
11 Ibid., 139. 
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public education system as a failure of the institutional setting in which the system was 
conceived. They assert three key findings 1) Successful schools have properly aligned 
“organizational characteristics,” such as “clear goals, an ambitious academic program, 
strong educational leadership, and high levels of teacher professionalism;”12 2) 
Successful schools have autonomy from “external bureaucratic influence;”13 3) The 
current public education system “inhibits the emergence of effective 
organization…because its institutions of democratic control function naturally to limit 
and undermine school autonomy.”14 As a recommendation for reform, Chubb and Moe 
assert, “The most sensible approach to genuine educational reform is therefore to move 
toward a true institutional solution – a different set of institutional arrangements that is 
compatible with, and indeed actively promotes and nurtures, the kinds of schools people 
want. The market alternative then becomes particularly attractive, for it provides a setting 
in which these organizations can flourish and take root.”15  
HISTORY OF SCHOOL CHOICE LEGISLATION 
After the Reagan administration laid the groundwork, the Republican party 
continued to promote school choice at the federal level, but found little success. George 
H. W. Bush campaigned for reelection on the promise of a $1,000 voucher (referred to as 
a “scholarship”) for low and middle-income families to send their children to private 
school. Bush’s reelection bid failed and the Clinton administration took a passive 
approach to school choice, leaving the issue to be debated at the state level.16 Key to the 
success of the first voucher laws at the state level was a bipartisan base of support and a 
                                                
12 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets and America’s Schools (Washington, DC, Brookings), 23. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 191. 
16 Viteritti, Walberg, and Wolf, “School Choice,” 141. 
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shift in language. Wisconsin (1990) and Ohio (1995) were the first to pass voucher laws, 
with aims to address the failing inner-city schools of Milwaukee and Cleveland 
respectively.17 These cities, whose school systems seemed locked in a downward spiral 
paralleled by many former-industrial Midwestern peers, spoke about school choice as just 
that—a choice; vouchers would provide poor children an alternative to a failing system.18 
This shift in description away from what Cooper describes as “the provocative language 
of capitalism, profit, exploitation, and commercialization”19 allowed room for support 
from the political left, who could now conceptualize school choice as a means to provide 
for those being underserved by the current system. As Viteritti describes, “If the rallying 
cry behind the first generation of agitation for choice was liberty, that behind the second 
was equality.”20 
The first charter school law passed in Minnesota in 1991, following shortly on the 
tails of the Wisconsin voucher law. The early adopters of charter legislation had similarly 
broad-based support, with California, Georgia and Michigan adopting charter laws by 
1993.21 Since Minnesota adopted its charter policy, 40 other states have passed laws 
allowing for the formation of charter schools.22 The National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools reports that as of 2011 approximately 5,600 charter schools were operating in the 
U.S., serving over two million students.23  
                                                
17 Ibid., 142. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Cooper and Randall, “Fear and Privatization,” 211. 
20 Viteritti, Walberg, and Wolf, “School Choice,” 143. 
21 Renzulli and Roscigno, “Charter School Policy, Implementation, and Diffusion Across the United 
States,” 346. 
22 “State Connections (Preview) | National Charter School Resource Center.” 
23 Grisham, “National Alliance for Public Charter Schools.” 
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KEY DEBATES IN THE CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT  
In the debate surrounding school choice theory, there are sociological and 
economic arguments made both in favor of and against charter schools. In “Creaming 
Versus Cropping: Charter School Enrollment Practices in Response to Market 
Incentives,” Lacireno-Paquet et al highlight some of the most prevalent of these: 
Arguments in Favor of Charter Schools 
• Introducing charters will dismantle the monopoly held by local governments on 
education, forcing public schools to improve the quality of their product through 
competition for students and funding;  
• The market will serve as a “leveling agent” that decreases race and class 
segregation as geography will no longer limit the schools that parents consider; 
• Parents, particularly low-income parents will be enabled by the “purchasing 
power” they hold to select the best school for their child;  
• Leading charter schools have achieved extraordinary results with students that 
low-income and minority students who typically fall victim to the achievement 
gap in terms of test scores, graduation rates and college enrollment.  
Arguments against Charter Schools 
• Information asymmetry will exacerbate segregation by race and class because 
low-income parents lack the resources to make fully informed school choices; 
• People are not “rational” and will make decisions based on criteria beyond school 
quality, such as location, advertising, and a perception of shared values;  
• Asymmetry in resources will exacerbate segregation given the lower capacity of 
low-income families to travel long distances to get a child to the preferred school; 
 9 
• Charter schools are incentivized to “skim the cream” from the public school 
system, recruiting those students who are most likely to succeed and whose 
parents are best positioned to support them through school; 
• Given the above concern, traditional public schools may stand to lose their top 
performing students and the associated per pupil funding and positive peer effects, 
yet still be expected to compete academically; 
• Charter schools are incentivized to scale quickly (perhaps more-so than is optimal 
to maintain quality) to achieve economies of scale; 
• Wide variability exists in results from charter schools including many that 
perform as poorly or worse than the traditional public school alternatives from 
which they attract students.24 
In addition, while these arguments can be debated from economic and sociological 
perspectives, they also represent tension between core American values, inviting emotion 
and fear into the discussion. With the perception that the stakes could not be higher due 
to 1) the waning competitiveness of the US in the global market and 2) a persistent 
achievement gap in student performance that highlights pervasive social and racial 
injustice, Americans are locked in debate on the value of school choice.  
It is not the purpose of this paper to weigh in on the debate over charter schools. 
The effectiveness of these schools is evidently varied across a wide spectrum of charter 
school policies and implementation. Instead, the author recognizes that charters are 
undeniably a part of the contemporary public education landscape. With charter policy 
being implemented in 41 states, the theoretical debate of whether or not charter schools 
should exist is a conversation that is quickly losing relevance. However, at this early 
                                                
24 Lacireno-Paquet et al., “Creaming Versus Cropping,” 147. 
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stage in the development of charter school policy and theory, the potential for charters is 
underdeveloped and thus unknown. With more development of the sector and ultimately, 
better data, charter policy can evolve in its sophistication and effectiveness.  
The current limitations on data and comprehensive evaluation of charter schools 
are due, in large part to the fragmented nature of the charter movement.  Most charters 
are “one-off” organizations that serve a specific community and never take their model to 
scale or expand beyond the initial geographic market. Not surprisingly, there is a wide 
range of success amongst these start-up schools. Many wish to scale their school models 
and broaden the scope of their organizational impact. However, scaling and expanding 
present extreme challenges for even the most successful charter school models. A 
research brief produced by the National Charter School Resource Center, “Scaling up 
High Quality Charter Schools: Approaches, Challenges, and Opportunities,” identifies 
some key challenges that CMOs have encountered:  
• Finding and funding facilities without the state support that traditional 
public schools enjoy; 
• Securing the financing necessary to cover the increased start-up 
operational costs that scaling or expanding requires; 
• Limited economies of scale—given the resource intensive model of most 
high-performing charter schools, including longer school days and 
extensive student support systems, the economic benefit typically 
associated with organizational scale is diminished; 
• Securing, retaining, and developing high-performing teachers is a 
cornerstone of many high-performing charter models, but talent pools are 
limited in many regions across the country; 
 11 
• “Mission Creep” is a danger for charter schools who, due to the financial 
stressors listed above must seek funding provided by foundations and 
government grants that is often tied to specific criteria or goals which may 
not relate directly to the school’s model.25 
Although the body of literature is slowly growing, there is a dearth of common 
theoretical frameworks and evidence-based best practices that charter school leaders can 
draw from in considering how to grow responsibly and effectively. While private sector 
CEOs can draw on a wealth of established and critically reviewed models, frameworks 
and resources to think through common business challenges, charter school leaders tend 
to operate in silos, inventing and reinventing the wheel as they think through the common 
challenges of scaling, replicating, and adapting their school models to fit the needs of 
education markets across a variety of social and/or political landscapes. This process is 
inefficient at best, and unlikely to elicit the best possible outcomes from the sector as a 
whole in the near term. Informing the business models of these schools will ultimately 
reveal their potential to “tip” the education system through the power of competition, or 
their inability to do so.   
 With this in mind, this report purports to provide a systematic framework for 
thinking through the growth of charter schools, with a specific focus on geographic 
expansion for established, high-performing Charter Management Organizations. In the 
next chapter, I will describe three existing models for thinking about organizational 
expansion, drawing from the private, nonprofit and education sectors respectively. In the 
third chapter, I will present a case study of a specific CMO, IDEA Public Schools, that 
encountered an array of challenges throughout its effort to expand operations from the 
                                                
25 “Scaling Up High-Quality Charter Schools | National Charter School Resource Center,” 7. 
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Rio Grande Valley to the Austin, TX education market.  Finally, I will introduce a new 
framework that integrates the most relevant and practical elements of existing 
frameworks into a new model designed to inform and enhance CMO practices. 
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Chapter 2: Models for New Market Development 
In this chapter, I investigate several models for market expansion. First, drawing 
from the business world from which school choice theory derives, I consider the 
framework laid out by economist, Michael Porter, commonly referred to “Porter’s Five 
Forces.” Next I examine a model generated by three scholars of social entrepreneurship, 
Gregory Dees, Beth Battle Anderson and Jane Wei-skillern concerning nonprofit growth. 
Finally, I consider a reference guide of recommendations for CMO leaders planning 
expansion, produced by Caitlin Farrell, Michelle Nayfack, Joanna Smith, Priscilla 
Wohlsetter and Annette Wong, researchers out the University of Southern California’s 
Rossier School of Education and the Center for Educational Governance.  
BUSINESS MODEL: “PORTER’S FIVE FORCES” 
In “The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy,” Michael Porter updates 
and refines his 1979 Harvard Business Review publication, “How Competitive Forces 
Shape Strategy.” This original publication is the cornerstone of a contemporary business 
education.  While the five forces comprise a framework to assess industry attractiveness, 
they are more broadly applied to a range of business strategy decisions, including how to 
select new geographic markets for business expansion. The five forces identified by 
Porter are Threat of Entry, Power of Suppliers, Power of Buyers, Threat of Substitutes 
and Rivalry Among Existing Competitors.  For each of these five forces, I will provide a 
brief description of its understanding in business terms before looking for applications to 
the education sector.  
 14 
Threat of Entry 
 This force is relevant as a “self-check” on a company looking to expand and on that 
company’s future threats if it chooses to expand. In this force are seven factors to 
consider:  
• Supply-side economies of scale: Is it cheaper (per unit) to produce at a large scale, 
deterring new entrants who can only enter the market on a small scale?  
• Demand-side benefits of scale or “network effects:” Does customers’ willingness 
to pay increase when the company serves many customers?  
• Customer switching costs: Are there financial or non-financial costs to customers 
when they change vendors?  
• Capital requirements: How significant are the start-up costs?  
• Incumbency advantages independent of size: Do existing competitors benefit from 
preferred locations, facilities, brand recognition and experience with the market 
that create advantages over new entrants?  
• Unequal access to distribution channels: Do incumbents have easier access to get 
their product to customers?  
• Restrictive government policy: Does government encourage or restrict new 
entrants through policy and/or incentives?26  
Education Market Application  
Several of these factors are relevant in considering school expansion:  
• Supply side economies of scale: As CMOs consider their potential fixed costs 
(such as the costs of securing a facility) in a new market, will they be able to 
maintain quality while “ramping up” when the cost per pupil is quite high?  In this 
                                                
26 Porter, “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy,” 81–82. 
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case, perhaps larger CMOs with more resources are better prepared to compete in 
markets where other competitors tend to be large and operating with the benefits 
of economies of scale. Similarly small CMOs may struggle in the early stages in 
geographic markets where fixed costs like real estate/rent tend to be higher. 
•  Customer switching costs:  CMOs will certainly want to consider the financial 
and non-financial switching costs to their target consumers.  Transportation is an 
example of a category of cost relevant to education consumers: will students 
require public transportation to arrive at school? How long will they have to travel 
and how much will it cost? If public transportation is not available, how will 
parents weigh the opportunity cost of their time spent transporting students? 
• Capital requirements: In order to attract funding sources, CMOs will need to have 
an accurate and realistic picture of the start-up costs for entering the new market 
and how they compare to alternative market opportunities.  
• Incumbency advantages independent of size: CMOs will certainly need to 
understand the competitive advantages of existing school alternatives in the 
market. How is the local school district perceived and what are its advantages in 
terms of facilities and other resources? Are other CMOs established in the area 
and have they carved out a particular niche in the market? 
• Restrictive government policy: How do state and local policies affect CMO 
activity? Does government support and encourage growth or limit it through 
charter authorization caps or funding restrictions?  
Power of Suppliers  
Consider the range of suppliers needed to produce the desired product or service 
and determine which are essential. Supplier groups are powerful if they are concentrated 
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(meaning there are few suppliers to choose from) and if they are not industry dependent 
(meaning they are not fully dependent on one industry for revenues). They also have 
more power when their products are differentiated and when there is no good substitute 
for their product. When suppliers are powerful, they have greater control in setting prices 
and terms of agreement, thus capturing more of the “value chain.”27 
Education Market Application 
Again, there is value to be gleaned from understanding this threat, though the 
application is easily lost in the jargon of price-setting and value chains, as leaders of 
mission-driven organizations are unlikely to think of their operations in those terms.  
While this force applies most directly to physical supplies, it also applies to labor supply. 
This supplier power is, perhaps the most important to consider in the education market. 
As Cooley writes, “The advocates of school choice seem to think that the majority of the 
educators would be replaced by an entirely different set of teachers once schools were 
privatized... There are currently massive deficits of trained teachers across the nation.”28 
In the context of a CMO’s mission, it must consider the availability of teachers and the 
relative power of teacher “suppliers,” such as teacher unions, teacher certification 
programs, and local school district (i.e. the current employer of active local teachers). 
Will the CMO have enough bargaining power with these suppliers of labor to attract a 
high-quality workforce?  
Power of Buyers 
Just as powerful suppliers can capture excess value in the profit-driven business, 
so can powerful customers.  Buyers are considered powerful if they are few in number, if 
                                                
27 Ibid., 83. 
28 Cooley, “Reevaluating the Politics and Research of School Choice,” 261. 
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the industry produces similar or comparable products or if the buyer faces high switching 
costs when considering a new vendor. Buyers generally demonstrate their power with 
price sensitivity, demonstrating a tendency to select the lowest cost provider.29  
Education Market Application  
Direct application here is limited, where the theory and mission behind most 
CMOs is to empower the buyer—in this case, parents of school-aged children. 
Presumably, as charter schools provide a public good, potential “buyers” are ample 
(though active “buyers” of alternative education may be few). Perhaps a more helpful 
measure of the force of buyers here is their relative understanding of the nuances of 
product offerings.  Do the target consumers have a firm understanding of what school 
options are available to them, how they differ from each other and how to access each?  
Threat of Substitutes 
Substitutes create the same or similar outcome as the industry product in a 
different way. They constitute any viable alternatives to consuming the industry product, 
including going without or making/doing it yourself. Examples of substitutes include 
driving instead of flying for a weekend vacation or using email instead of “snail mail.”30 
This threat is high if the tradeoff for performance is relatively small compared with price 
and if the switching costs for the buyer are low.31  
Education Market Application 
In completing a competitive analysis, CMOs should consider non-school 
competitors such as home-schooling and dropping out/early entry to the workforce to 
                                                
29 Porter, “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy,” 83–84. 
30 Ibid., 84. 
31 Ibid., 85. 
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fully understand the market they aim to serve and their ability to compete with those 
alternatives.  
Rivalry Among Existing Competitors 
Rivalry among competitors in an industry has the power to drive down profitability. 
Rivalry should be considered in terms of its intensity and its basis. Intensity is high when  
• There are many competitors, especially if they are of similar size and power;  
• Industry growth is slow so competitors must fight for share of the existing market; 
• Exit barriers are high; 
• Competitors are committed to the business for reasons beyond profitability.32  
Education Market Application 
Understanding rivalry is of particular importance to CMOs, who will need to 
understand the landscape of other charter school providers, their size and respective 
competitive advantages. The CMO will also need to investigate its future relationship 
with the local school district, for whom exit barriers are sky high because exit is not an 
option. By Porter’s reasoning, charters can and should anticipate intense rivalry given 
that most school providers are committed to the industry for non-profit motivations.  
Porter’s Five Forces in the Education Market 
While Porter’s framework provides a variety of useful factors for consideration 
when considering CMO expansion, it fails to deliver the same value as a comprehensive 
framework that it offers to the business community.  Unsurprisingly, given Porter’s 
economist background, the competitive framework is driven by a simple business 
question: what is the relative opportunity for profitability in this market? The mission-
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based nature of the CMO cannot offer a direct substitute for profit in this framework.  
The mission is likely based on student outcomes (measured by college readiness) but also 
incorporates targeting an underserved population and empowering the consumer, rather 
than seeking to limit the consumer’s power. In addition, the framework is limited to the 
early phases of organizational expansion—merely selecting an appropriate market.  It 
does not directly discuss organizational preparation for expansion or implementation.  
NONPROFIT MODEL: “SCALING SOCIAL IMPACT” 
Recognizing the limitations of applying strategies that are purely profit-driven in 
the social sector, where organizations are expected to be mission-driven, social 
entrepreneurs and nonprofit leaders from a variety of organizations have struggled to 
develop their own criteria for tackling scale and expansion. This kind of thinking is 
relatively new and no single model has emerged which might be considered a parallel to 
Porter’s Five Forces. However, the Center for the Advancement of Social 
Entrepreneurship at Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business has developed a variety 
of tools and resources for leaders in the social sector to draw from when considering how 
to strategically develop and scale their ideas. A paper produced by Gregory Dees, Faculty 
Director and Adjunct Professor at the Center and Beth Battle Anderson, Managing 
Director of the center, along with Jane Wei-Skillern, an assistant professor on the faculty 
at Harvard Business School, offers the beginnings of a framework from which nonprofit 
leaders might think about scaling an organization.  In this paper, “Scaling Social Impact,” 
Dees et al argue that: 
 
Social entrepreneurs, foundation officers, and policy makers need to step back 
and take a more strategic and systematic approach to the question of how to 
spread social innovations. Too often they frame the problem in terms of either 
‘replication,’ the diffusion and adoption of model social program, or, more 
recently, ‘scaling up,’ which commonly entails significant organizational growth 
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and central coordination. While neither of these concepts is inherently ill-
conceived, failure to place them within a broader strategic framework can blind 
social sector leaders to promising options and bias the toward a limited set of 
strategies.33 
  
 Dees et al break the growth process into three steps. First, leaders must be able to 
define the organization’s innovation.  The authors suggest asking critical questions about 
what makes the organization’s work distinctive and what sets it apart from the work of 
others who are attempting to address the same social need--competitors.  Furthermore, 
what about the organization is essential to its impact and what might be changed without 
compromising outcomes?  The authors identify three of the most common models for 
scaling innovations: 
• Organizational models provide an “overarching structure for mobilizing people 
and resources to serve a common purpose;”  
• Programs provide “an integrated set of actions that serve a specific purpose;” 
• Principles provide “general guidelines and values about how to serve a given 
purpose.”34  
Once an organization understands the type of innovation it has to offer, Dees et al 
suggest taking the next step by considering an appropriate mechanism for that type of 
innovation.  The three mechanisms they highlight are:  
• Dissemination, or “actively providing information, and sometimes technical 
assistance, to other looking to bring an innovation to their community;” 
• Affiliation, “a formal relationship defined by an ongoing agreement between two 
or more parties to be part of an identifiable network;” or 
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• Branching through “the creation of local sites through one large organization, 
much like company-owned stores in the business world.”35  
Dissemination might be informal, as in resource-sharing, or more formalized such 
as packaging and selling a particular program curriculum to develop a revenue stream. 
Affiliation might be loosely defined such as a coalition between organizations with a 
similar mission, or highly structured systems like franchises. Branching requires the most 
central coordination of the three models and, consequently, typically requires the most 
resources as a scaling mechanism.36 
In order to select the most appropriate mechanism for scaling, Dees et al provide 
the “Five R’s Framework” to guide analysis.  By considering readiness, receptivity, 
resources, risks, and returns, leaders can more effectively analyze how best to scale.  
Readiness 
To analyze readiness, the leader should consider first whether there is 
demonstrable success that isn’t dependent on existing leadership or other organizational 
circumstances. Further, the individual chosen to drive the scaling process must fully 
understand what elements of the innovation are required for success. The authors suggest 
that if leaders cannot answer these two critical questions, the organization is not yet ready 
to scale.37 
Education Market Application 
Many charter schools begin and flourish under the commitment of a particularly 
charismatic leader.  The success of the school may be attributable to the individual’s 
leadership rather than to the strength of the model employed. In addition, many high 
                                                




performing charter schools employ very similar tactics and curricula. It is reasonable to 
question whether staff, administration and consumers can identify what particular 
innovation separates one charter from its competitors.  
Receptivity 
To analyze receptivity, the leaders should consider which mechanism will allow 
for the most positive response from target communities. “If an innovation is complex, 
represents a radical departure from accepted practice, threatens influential local parties, 
or clashes with dominant values or ideologies in different communities, it will like be met 
with resistance.  Locals my also resist adopting innovations if they are uncomfortable 
yielding ownership, control, or credit to outsiders.”38 In this case, the higher the central 
control of the mechanism chosen, the greater the resistance the organization is likely to 
face.  
Education Market Application 
This criterion is highly applicable to the School Choice Movement in general and 
to charter schools specifically. Communities vary widely in their response to charter 
school development and the impact it may have on local schools. It stands to reason that 
before selecting a destination for expansion and a means of expansion, CMO leaders 
should have a firm understanding of the reception they are likely to receive by the local 
community. 
Resources 
To analyze resources, the authors suggest asking the following questions; “What 
are the resource requirements for the strategies under consideration? Can the innovation 
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be defined and spread in a way that reduces costs while preserving effectiveness? ...What 
are the opportunities to generate renewable and reliable revenue streams?”39 The authors 
suggest that if demand is too low to cover the costs of a particular strategy, leaders must 
have a sustainable plan to make up the difference.  
Education Market Application 
Sources of revenue are of utmost importance in practical charter expansion. 
Without funding, charter schools will lack facilities and access to high quality labor. 
CMO leaders must, then, have a firm grasp of the funding requirements to maintain the 
standards of their model in the financial environment of the new market where costs of 
real estate, labor and other inputs may be very different. 
Risks 
Dees et al next suggest that leaders must consider risks, both to society and to 
their organization.  Important questions include, “How likely is it that an innovation will 
be implemented incorrectly or will fail to achieve its intended impact? If this happens, 
what are the potential negative effects on the clients and communities being served?” The 
more severe the potential consequences, the greater the need is for a mechanism with 
central control. However, a mechanism with tight control (like tight affiliation or 
branching) incurs greater risk to the central organization as a whole.40 
Education Market Application 
The risk analysis is highly applicable to CMOs whose limited funding and 
developing brand dictate a low tolerance for risky ventures. A significant financial loss 
may destroy the financial footing of a young organization. 





Finally, Dees et al recommend assessing the potential returns of a particular 
mechanism. This criterion considers the balance between quantity and quality of services 
that an organization can offer. While dissemination or loose-affiliation can allow for 
broader geographic reach at a lower-cost, they may allow for compromised quality in the 
services rendered. The authors suggest that, “when the need is urgent and the risks are 
low, it may be wise to forgo the benefits of central coordination” in order to expand 
quickly, but a cost-benefit analysis is essential to understanding which is the right 
course.41 
Education Market Application 
This criterion is compelling in that it requires school leaders to define and 
prioritize costs and benefits within the framework of their school mission and goals.  
School leaders must decide whether student outcomes, quantity of students served, or 
school brand development (to name a few examples) is of primary importance at its 
current stage of development and expansion. They must then recognize the tradeoffs 
implicit in these priorities.  
Nonprofit Model In Education  
While compelling, this framework offers two significant challenges to the typical 
CMO “mindset.” The first is the implication that physical replication is not always the 
best means to achieve a broad impact. CMOs, driven by their private sector influences 
tend to be highly branded and proprietary of their curriculum. The idea that they might 
spread their innovation by relinquishing some degree of control will present a challenge 
to many charters.  
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Second, and relatedly, the recommendation that scaling should be a slow and 
deliberate process may seem counterintuitive to many CMO leaders, who operate with a 
sense of urgency to address a social injustice and feel driven to scale quickly. Dees et al 
use a charter school network as an example of a nonprofit organization that has chosen to 
expand its impact through “principles” rather than “programs” or “organizational 
structure” in order to expand efficiently. As the authors describe, KIPP is a network of 
charter schools who share a common set of operating values, known as the Five Pillars: 
High Expectations, Choice and Commitment, More Time, Power to Lead and Focus on 
Results.42 KIPP schools adopt these pillars to join the network and make use of the KIPP 
brand, but individual schools are run by local CMOs (for example, KIPP Austin) who 
actually hold the school charter and are responsible for its outcomes.43 This decentralized 
model has allowed KIPP to expand faster than any of its peers in the charter world, which 
invites the question of why more CMOs are not choosing this path to expansion. The 
answer lies in the fact that KIPP has received broad criticism for the inconsistent 
performance of its schools. By loosening controls on operations, KIPP allowed for 
greater variability in the implementation of its model. Application of the framework 
given by Dees et al, may then illuminate the debate among CMOs on centralized control.  
EDUCATION MODEL: “SCALING UP CHARTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS” 
A group of researchers from the Center of Educational Governance at the 
University of Southern California’s Rossier School of Education produced a CMO 
reference guide, having interviewed 25 leaders at CMOs around the country. This guide, 
entitled Scaling Up Charter Management Organizations: Eight Key Lessons for Success, 
represents one of the first attempts to bring together best practices and practical 
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recommendations for a broad audience of CMOs. As the title suggests, the authors 
provide eight key suggestions to guide CMO leaders, each accompanied by several sub-
steps that are meant to help walk leaders through the growth process: 
 
1) Create a Plan for Growth 
• Develop a Mission that Shapes Growth; 
• Establish short- and long-term plans for growth; 
• Grow at the right pace for your organization. 
2) Know the Landscape 
• Know the ins and outs of charter laws;  
• Be politically savvy; 
• Venture out and engage your community; 
• Choose new locations strategically;  
• Adapt to local community needs. 
3) Know Who You Are and How to Communicate it 
• Know Who You Are, then Develop a Brand; 
• Broadcast Your Brand to External Stakeholders; 
• Seek Brand Consistency Across School Sites; 
4) Money Matters 
• Seek diverse funding sources; 
• Secure funding for specific purposes; 
• Consider any “strings attached” before accepting funding. 
5) Invest in People Early 
• Staff up in advance of growth; 
• Develop a leadership pipeline; 
• Recruit a diverse board of directors. 
6) Cultivate Relationships 
• Foster relationships with other educational institutions: 
• Create public-private partnerships; 
• Build relationships with planning partners. 
7) Measure Your Success 
• Be results-driven;   
• Grade yourself systematically and regularly. 
8) Plan to be Flexible 
• Plan ahead, then use your plan;  
• Be willing to change directions.44 
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While the guidebook provides a useful roadmap for new leaders who are just 
beginning to think about growth, it is also limited in its sophistication and practicality. 
The key lessons are gained from interviews with 25 CMO leaders but the criteria for 
CMO inclusion in the study are fairly loose. The participants included do not necessarily 
represent on high-performing CMOs, those with a proven financial record, or those with 
a particularly successful experience in scaling. Rather the key criterion on which CMOs 
were invited to participate was that they operated at least three schools and had plans to 
expand further.45 What results is a compilation of collective wisdom from assorted 
charter schools.  The recommendations themselves have not been rigorously analyzed or 
tested across different settings or environments. The lessons are deceptively simple.  
Even the first sub-step of the first lesson, “Develop a Mission that Shapes Growth”46 is a 
step that might require months of development and collaboration by a board of directors.  
A great deal of practitioner and theoretical literature is dedicated to the process of 
mission development, a step that occupies just two paragraphs in this guide.  
Because the guide attempts to be broad rather than specific, it is not particularly 
nuanced in its recommendations for considering geographic expansion. However, Steps 
Two through Six are certainly relevant and may prove helpful as a jumping off point for 
school leaders looking to expand geographically.  
Although it is the most targeted of the three models considered in this chapter, 
this framework remains limited in applicability given that the theories discussed are 
virtually untested, underdeveloped and extremely broad in nature. However, the ideas 
presented do represent a first step towards developing a framework that is readily 
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applicable in the charter school context and the input from a range of experienced charter 
professionals should not be discounted.  
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Chapter 3: IDEA Public Schools in Austin, a Case Study 
The following case study draws primarily from a variety of publically available 
sources, but also incorporates insights gleaned from confidential interviews with 
administrators at IDEA Public Schools and other leaders in the Austin education field.  
AUSTIN EDUCATION LANDSCAPE 
In “School Reform in Austin, Texas: 1954-2008,” Dr. Larry Cuban examines the 
socio-political history which has defined the context of Austin’s contemporary education 
challenges and reform efforts. Cuban begins by reaching back into Austin’s racial history, 
describing a lethargic, if not resistant response to the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in 
Brown v. Board of Education, which declared unconstitutional state laws that established 
separate schools for black and white students.47 In response to the ruling, the Austin 
School Board and then-superintendent, Irby Carruth, adopted a policy of “Freedom of 
Choice,” which allowed students of color to transfer to white schools in their 
neighborhood. With no substantive support to accompany this policy, the option resulted 
in very few transfers and very little change in the make-up of public schools for the first 
decade of desegregation.48 Ten years after the initial policy shift, the district made a 
second incremental policy change, this time introducing “cross-over” teachers with 33 
black teachers teaching in white schools and 52 white teachers working in black schools. 
Four years later, the student demographics had not shifted; the two previously segregated 
black schools remained all black and white schools served just a handful of black 
students.49  
                                                
47 Cuban, School Reform in Austin, Texas, 1954-2008, 24. 
48 Ibid., 28. 
49 Ibid.,  26. 
 30 
 In 1968 a team from the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
determined that AISD was out of compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 given the 
failure of “Freedom of Choice” to dismantle school segregation. Under their 
recommendation, the Department of Justice filed suit against AISD in 1970. Throughout 
the 1970s, the AISD court case shuffled through the federal judicial system while a new, 
reform-minded superintendent, Jack Davidson, battled with a reluctant white population 
in Austin to effect change in the school district.  When his desegregation efforts were 
largely unsuccessful, he worked to improve the quality of education at schools that served 
minority students.50  
 In 1978, a district judge required AISD to submit a tri-ethnic integration plan, 
formally acknowledging that education and race in Austin was not merely a black and 
white issue. The following year, the judge approved a plan that was developed by AISD, 
the DOJ, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and MALDEF. The plan provided new 
schools in East Austin, and incorporated bilingual programs, affirmative action in hiring 
practices and busing of both black and white students. If the federal district court 
determined that the plan had been successfully implemented, it would end its jurisdiction 
over AISD after three years.51 
 Anti-busing rallies and negative public sentiment precipitated Superintendent 
Davidson’s decision to accept another position and he was replaced by John Ellis, who 
had experience in the U.S. Office of Education and had served as a superintendent in 
Ohio. Ellis served his first few years in the superintendency managing the extreme racial 
tension that the court-mandated desegregation fostered. He was tasked with forcing the 
district to comply with the stipulations of the mandate in order to release AISD from 
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federal court jurisdiction as planned, while stemming the tide of white flight that took 
white Austin families into nearby suburbs. In 1983, AISD applied for release from the 
judicial mandate and was granted that release in 1986.52 
 In the post-federal court jurisdiction era, gains that AISD had made in 
desegregation were found to be superficial and fleeting. With the end of the mandate 
came the end of busing, and with that the demise of racially diverse schools. Cuban cites, 
“In 1990, for example, of 91 schools in AISD, 45 had student enrollments either 75 
percent minority or over 75 percent white. A decade later 61 schools were either over 70 
percent white or 70 percent minority.”53 Cuban reports that in the post-mandate era, 
AISD essentially reverted to a two-tier segregated system, attempting, rather than 
integrate schools, to simply improve the quality of education provided at the minority-
serving schools: “To mostly Eastside minority schools, the district sent extra resources in 
the name of equity. District administrators expected these principals and teachers to no 
longer blame poverty, race, or family pathology for poor student performance. Instead, 
academic excellence and reducing the gap in achievement between whites and minorities 
would now become the staff’s primary responsibility.”54 
Cuban describes the 1990s in Austin as a lost decade. Jim Hensley, a former 
Waco superintendent served for just two years, followed by James Fox, a superintendent 
from the suburbs of Atlanta known for a business-like approach. Under Fox, the district 
endured a “cleaning house” era. Fox was later referred to as “Attila the Hun” for his 
practices that drove out weak and strong administrators alike. In his first two years as 
Superintendent, 30 of 96 principals had retired, been reassigned, or transferred out of the 
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district.55 Cuban writes that during the ‘90s, the district “responded to state mandated 
reforms and low academic performance in largely minority and poor schools by grabbing 
one innovation after another when each superintendent entered … only to dump them 
when they exited. Here were the spinning wheels of reform with a vengeance.”56 
 The ‘90s culminated in a disturbing string of events throughout the spring of 1998 
to 1999. During this time, the District and two of its top administrators were investigated 
and indicted by the Travis County Attorney for manipulating scores on the Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills as well as drop-out rates in order to improve TEA ratings 
for the district. Soon after, the Citywide Parent-Teacher Association declared a lack of 
confidence in the Board of Trustees for the first time. The Texas Comptroller announced 
its intention to conduct an audit of AISD, uninvited by the district, considering the recent 
legal accusations and financial inefficiencies. The loss of public confidence and the 
uncertainty of scandal lead bond rating agencies to place AISD on a “negative watch.” 
Throughout the tumult of this year and a half, the AISD Board underwent a 
superintendent search, having invited the divisive Fox to leave after just three years. The 
search was interrupted repeatedly by these events, which clearly made attracting talent an 
extreme challenge.  The board finally appointed Pat Forgione as superintendent in August 
1999.  The day following Forgione’s appointment, AISD was rated as an “Unacceptable” 
district by the Texas Education Agency.57  
Forgione’s term as Superintendent represented a positive era for AISD. Forgione 
was known for “unrelenting optimism” and an intense commitment to restoring public 
trust, data transparency, and student performance, particularly for those “at the bottom.”58  
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Cuban outlines three phases of reforms under Forgione in AISD that characterized his 10-
year term from 1999-2008. The first phase, lasting three years, was focused on 
“restor[ing] public trust in AISD’s data and build an instructional infrastructure… 
through implementing data systems, accountability procedures, curriculum standards, and 
staff development programs.”59  
 The next phase of Forgione’s reforms took a focus on the classroom. With the 
help of Chief Academic Officer, Darlene Westbrook, the district developed Instructional 
Planning Guides that aligned curriculum to a new state test, The Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills as well as benchmark assessments intended to help monitor 
students’ progress throughout the year and identify those in need of more help prior to the 
state testing time. Finally, the district implemented data-based professional development 
opportunities, relying on testing data to show teachers and principals where there were 
gaps in capacity.60 During this era, AISD saw graduation rates increase from 72% to 80% 
though a gap persisted for low-income families (72%) and English language learners 
(53%).  
 Finally, Forgione introduced a reform plan centered around High School 
Redesign in 2005. During the final four years of his tenure, he instituted a reform plan for 
all 11 high schools, giving “urgent priority” to those schools which had been persistently 
labeled academically unacceptable in the preceding years. The redesign efforts directed 
schools to develop small learning communities (SLCs) for students and teachers as well 
as professional learning communities between teachers and administrators. School 
leaders were allowed to select between two research-based instructional models, or 
design and propose an alternative model. The goal was to personalize instruction and 
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foster innovation and collaboration, while remaining structured and focused on state 
curriculum standards.61 While the flexible nature of the High School Redesign initiative 
allowed for school level leaders to implement, with local discretion, the approach that 
best fit their campus, the results were uneven and underwhelming.  While graduation 
rates improved marginally, most gains in student test scores were limited to the 
elementary school level and the achievement gap remained relatively untouched.  
FINANCIAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES UNDER FORGIONE 
Throughout Forgione’s time in AISD, he battled not only internal challenges, but 
also a wealth of external challenges driven by state and national policy shifts. Most 
notably, from a financial perspective, Forgione faced a highly inconsistent funding 
structure. In 1993 the state enacted a school funding formula intended to balance funding 
between districts with high property wealth and districts with low property wealth. The 
formula led to hard-to-predict revenues: in 2000 the state required Austin to give $55M. 
In 2003, it was required to give $158M which resulted in teacher lay-offs and program 
cuts.62 At the same time, AISD leadership faced shifts in policy to mirror the reforms of 
the accountability era around the country.  At the most basic level, the state and, in its 
name, the Texas Education Agency, pursued greater control over local governance 
structures, curriculum and instruction through increasing focus on standardized testing 
and the school and district rating system.63 
CONTEMPORARY AISD AND THE AUSTIN EDUCATION MARKET 
Pat Forgione’s departure in 2009 marked a transition to the contemporary era of 
Austin’s public education system. Dr. Meria Carstarphen, former Superintendent of Saint 
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Paul Public Schools in Minnesota, was selected by the Board of Trustees to replace 
Forgione. Her tenure has been characterized by recognition of the growing interest in 
school choice and an attempt to provide intra-district alternatives, in hopes of retaining 
more students. In an address at the 2013 SXSWedu conference, Carstarphen said, “The 
concept that we are the only choice for families doesn’t exist anymore.”64 In addition to 
traditional neighborhood schools, AISD offers 13 magnet schools and “focus academies,” 
including an arts and sciences magnet, a fine arts magnet and a single-sex leadership 
academy for girls.65 In recent years, Carstarphen has proposed expanding single-sex 
school opportunities and introducing in-district charters.  
HISTORY OF IDEA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
IDEA Public Schools was founded in 2000 by Tom Torkelson and JoAnn Gama. 
Both Teach for America alumni, Torkelson and Gama started IDEA as an after school 
program designed to help their students in Donna, Texas overcome deficiencies in 
academic preparation and to promote college readiness. Following their TFA service, 
Gama and Torkelson sought and were granted a state charter and opened IDEA as a 
comprehensive school serving grades 4th -8th. IDEA Academy Donna has since expanded 
to serve grades K-12 and graduated its first class in 2007.66 The IDEA school model is 
not unlike that of its peers in the community of high-performing charter schools. They 
rely on a longer school day, highly individualized instruction and student services, and an 
expectation of college attendance for all students that is cultivated from elementary 
school. IDEA operates with a mission to “prepare students from underserved 
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communities for success in college and citizenship.”67 Supporting that mission are six 
core values that any IDEA staff member can list: 
1) Closing the Achievement Gap and ensuring college success is the best 
way to help our students succeed in life, contribute to their communities, 
and overcome the obstacles they face. Achieving this requires the 
following beliefs and behaviors: 
2) No Excuses: We control our destiny. What we do during the day matters 
more than poverty, parent education level, or other external factors. When 
the adults in the system get it right, our students are successful. 
Conversely, when our students fail, we don’t blame unsupportive parents, 
parent education level, or other external factors: we look in the mirror and 
take responsibility. 
3) Whatever it Takes: Through continuous improvement we achieve 
ambitious results. Those most successful at IDEA seek feedback, pour 
over the data, identify root causes, and implement solutions. 
4) 100% Every Day: Our mission and goals apply to 100% of our students, 
100% of the time. Creating opportunities that didn’t exist isn’t easy, and it 
requires that people give their best every day. 
5) Sweating the Small Stuff: The difference between excellence and 
mediocrity lies in paying attention and caring about the countless details 
that go into effective execution. 
6) Team and Family: As the source of strength for our organization, we are 
committed to attracting and developing high caliber people.68 
The core values place a high degree of responsibility on school professionals to go above 
and beyond, and internalize a responsibility for the success of the students they serve.  
In 2005 IDEA Public Schools launched an expansion campaign and established 
the goal of operating 22 schools by 2012. IDEA’s growth model was not clearly defined 
in its early years of expansion.  Leaders experimented with size of new schools as well as 
which and how many grades a new school should open with, often in response to the 
stipulations attached to funding opportunities. For example, in order to compete for a 
grant from the Gates Foundation, IDEA opened a new school that started off serving 
grades K, 6 and 9 instead of their more typical model of K-2 and 7-8.  Leaders ultimately 
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decided to stick with the previous model for a variety of reasons: recruiting and retaining 
high school students was far more challenging than younger students. Additionally, 
students were less successful in the high school if they had not participated in the IDEA 
middle school curriculum. In anonymous interviews with the author of this case study, 
IDEA administrators reported a great deal of confusion and no small amount of logistical 
troubleshooting with these early expansion efforts.  One staff member, who served as a 
“founding principal” of a school in the Rio Grande Valley recalls starting the school year 
without a school facility. The school operated on a local college campus for several 
weeks, followed by a church community center for several weeks, before eventually 
moving into portables on the site where they would eventually build a permanent facility. 
Despite the, at times, haphazard approach to expansion, IDEA found great success in its 
growth in the Rio Grande Valley.  The community was very receptive to the school 
model and its college-going focus. In addition, a lack of competition from other charter 
schools in the region made growth relatively easy, with demand easily outstripping 
supply. As of the 2011-2012 school year, IDEA was operating 20 schools in 10 
communities across the Rio Grande Valley in Hidalgo and Cameron Counties.  
A new expansion plan (released in 2012) established the goal to become the 
largest producer of low-income college graduates in the Rio Grande Valley. Further, the 
plan established a goal of expanding beyond the RGV into Central Texas. According to 
this plan, by 2017 IDEA will operate “56 schools in three regions, educating thousands of 
students on their road to college.”69 
According to IDEA administrators, this plan introduced four criteria for 
geographic expansion:  
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1) Established need demonstrated by a persistent achievement gap in a conducive 
competitive environment; 
2) Clear demand, demonstrated by the size of waiting lists at existing charter 
schools in the market and the demographic trajectory of the target population; 
3) Sustainability due to an infrastructure conducive to scaling schools and private 
and philanthropic support in the area; 
4) Partnership Opportunities. 
In the 2011-2012 school year, IDEA opened new schools in four communities. 
They expanded in two existing markets, Brownsville and McAllen, opening a second 
elementary and a second middle school in each community. IDEA also opened IDEA 
Carver in San Antonio and IDEA Allan in Austin.70 These two ventures represent a 
serious shift in the expansion of IDEA, moving from a rural to an urban market.  
IDEA Allan not only represents a significant geographic market shift for IDEA 
Public Schools, it also represents a shift in school model. While previous IDEA schools 
have operated under the sole discretion and leadership of IDEA administrators, IDEA 
Allan was the first—and currently only—IDEA school to operate as an “in-district 
charter” in a collaborative relationship with the Austin Independent School District.  In 
this partnership, IDEA essentially took over Allan Elementary, an eastside neighborhood 
school with a history in AISD that dates back to 1957.  
IDEA IN AUSTIN: A TUMULTUOUS MARKET ENTRY 
Amidst ongoing efforts to reform AISD schools on the east side of Austin, 
including a “reconstitution plan,” required by the Texas Education Agency for two failing 
high schools, AISD entered into discussion with IDEA Public Schools in the spring of 
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2011. One of the high schools in question was Eastside Memorial High School. The 
EMHS campus formerly housed Johnston High School, a school that had figured largely 
in Forgione’s High School Redesign efforts due to its persistently low performance.  In 
June of 2008, the Commissioner of Education ordered that Johnston be closed due to its 
failure to turn around its performance record. The commissioner, however, allowed AISD 
to “repurpose” the campus, giving it a new name and school number, and completing an 
overhaul of faculty and staff. The new school, known as the Eastside Memorial High 
School at the Johnston campus, opened the following fall.71 Despite four separate 
interventions and restructurings between 2009 and 2012, the school continued to be rated 
as Academically Unacceptable, and closure was threatened once again.  In order to keep 
the campus open, AISD agreed to the TEA reconstitution in plan, under which it must 
contract an outside provider to initiate turnaround efforts by the 2013-2014 school year. 
AISD put out an RFP from outside contractors and IDEA Public Schools saw this an 
opportunity to jumpstart expansion into Central Texas.  
On November 3rd, 2011 AISD Superintendent Meria Carstarphen and IDEA CEO, 
Tom Torkelson, formally announced a proposal to convert the Eastside Memorial 
Vertical Team (meaning the AISD schools that comprise a feeder pattern into Eastside 
Memorial High School) into a system of in-district charters, operated by IDEA.72  
The proposal received a lukewarm community response, which was not surprising 
given the seeming revolving door of reform efforts for the campus. Shortly after the 
announcement, opponents of the plan emerged: In November, Ed Fuller, a former 
University of Texas professor and vocal charter school opponent, released a report that 
called into question IDEA’s claims of superior academic performance and college 
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matriculation.73 The report was widely distributed by Education Austin, a labor union for 
AISD employees, who had also been developing a proposal to create an in-district 
charter.74 In the short time between the public proposal and the scheduled board vote, a 
variety of activist groups took on the issue including CoalitionSAUS, PRIDE of the 
Eastside and a subgroup of Occupy Austin, called “Occupy AISD.”  
Most notable among opposition groups was PRIDE of the Eastside, whose name 
echoes the school motto of Eastside Memorial High School. The mission of this group, as 
reported on its website is to: 
  
Protect public education in East Austin by ensuring that all students have access 
to a high quality, comprehensive education; Recognize the accomplishments of 
East Austin Schools and the importance of youth leadership; Innovate to 
overcome educational challenges and plan for success in our public schools; 
Defend our neighborhood public schools and our East Austin students, families 
and teachers against injustice and unfair treatment by advocating for their rights 
and needs; Educate students, families, community members, administrators, 
teachers and ourselves by researching and exploring best practices in education 
and authentic community engagement.75  
 
Vincent Tovar, spokesperson for the group, is an Eastside parent of a then-kindergartener 
and Treasurer of the PTA at Govalle elementary school. He had several editorials 
published in the Austin American Statesman and the Austin Chronicle, gave a host of 
interviews on local news outlets, released extended interviews on youtube.com and 
organized community meetings and protests that attracted hundreds of parents and 
community members. 
Though slated to vote on the proposal on December 12th, the School Board chose 
to delay the vote and hold a special meeting dedicated to the issue. The meeting took 
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place on December 19th, and lasted nearly six hours with a vote taking place just before 
1:00 a.m. Dozens of community members spoke out, having stood in line for hours to 
sign up for the opportunity to address the board. The comments of these community 
members reflected a host of frustrations and fears about the proposed changes, mistrust of 
the IDEA’s record, and anger about a perceived lack of transparency in the planning 
process.76 Throughout the standing-room only meeting, approximately 100 more people 
gathered outside, most of them opponents of the proposal who chanted and picketed with 
signs despite heavy rain. The ultimate decision of the school board – 6 to 3 in favor of the 
proposal – was met with angry shouts and hostility from a tense crowd.77 
After the proposal passed in December 2011, IDEA moved forward with the 
contract, which outlined a plan to serve grades K, 1st, 2nd, and 6th in the 2012-13 school 
year at the Allan Elementary building, then add 3rd grade to the Allan site and move 6th 
and 7th grade to Eastside Memorial in 2013-2014. The plan involved building grade by 
grade until Eastside Memorial served its first graduating class in 2019. The choice to 
begin with a primary school program is consistent with IDEA’s scale-up model in the Rio 
Grande Valley, but was a decision that troubled many affected families, given that the 
elementary school had been given an “Acceptable” rating by the Texas Education 
Agency in its two most recent evaluations. Although Eastside Memorial High School had 
been rated as “Unacceptable,” and was under the reconstitution plan required by TEA, 
there was no such warning signal to suggest that Allan Elementary should be the target of 
a school takeover. Parents, organized activists, and other concerned community members 
continued to speak out against the policy details that would affect Allan, and ultimately 
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the full Eastside Memorial Vertical Team. Among the most commonly expressed 
grievances were:  
1. Allan Elementary teachers would be required to reapply to teach at IDEA Allan, 
sit in a reserve pool for assignment to another AISD school, or resign; 
2. A lack of transparency and flexibility in the opportunity for Allan Elementary 
families to “opt out” of IDEA Allan in favor of attending Govalle or Ortega, two 
neighboring AISD elementary schools; 
3. Potential for overcrowding at Govalle and Ortega from those who opted out of 
IDEA Allan.78  
4. General confusion about the changes in curriculum and extracurricular 
opportunities that would be available to IDEA Allan students, including the 
school’s ability to serve students with special needs.  
The opt-out for IDEA Allan was broadly exercised, with 99 of the 167 students living in 
the Allan attendance zone (to whom, attendance at IDEA had been guaranteed) electing 
to attend another AISD elementary. IDEA’s 600 remaining seats were filled by students 
from across AISD who chose to apply. Preference was given to those in the Eastside 
feeder schools, who ultimately filled just ¼ of the spots. IDEA was forced to recruit 
broadly and aggressively to meet its enrollment minimums as outlined in the contract 
with AISD, at the expense, many argue, of IDEA’s goal to serve low-income students. 
IDEA counters that it has re-attracted students from other Austin charter schools (and 
their associated per pupil funding) back into AISD and that it serves a population that is 
84% low-income.79 None of the teachers remained from Allan Elementary.80 4 of the 18 
teachers hired and one academic counselor did come from the AISD talent pool.81 
                                                
78 Whittaker, “Farewell to Allan.” 
79 Ibid. 
 43 
School Board Elections 
Despite the set-back of IDEA’s approval by the board, opposition to the 
partnership, most notably Pride of the Eastside, quickly regrouped and mobilized with an 
eye on the upcoming school board election. Three board members who had voted for the 
IDEA proposal were up for re-election in November of 2012, including Board President 
Mark Williams. A fourth member, Annette LoVoi who had voted against the proposal, 
decided not to seek re-election.82 The first school board election to be held in November, 
and to coincide with a Presidential election, this race attracted more attention and greater 
turnout than past school board votes. According to the Austin American Statesman, the 
IDEA vote was a key issue in the election, along with the leadership of Superintendent 
Carstarphen and “community trust.”83 The election resulted in four new board members, 
two of whom explicitly expressed an anti-IDEA platform (Gina Hinojosa and Jayme 
Mathias), while the other two (Amber Elenz and Ann Teich) campaigned more indirectly 
on the platform of “restoring trust.” Following the election, all four new members stated 
an opposition to the process that had preceded the IDEA vote. 
 Immediately following the election, the IDEA partnership resurfaced as a school 
board agenda item. According to the original contract, the partnership could be 
terminated for the following year by either party by giving notice by December 31st of the 
previous year.84 New board member, Jayme Mathias, who now represented the district in 
which Allan Elementary was located, requested that the board review the contract, 
stating, “The decision to partner with IDEA was made with a board that no longer 
exists…the intent is to have a conversation and see where we as the Board of Trustees 
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fall on this issue.”85 The board invited IDEA leadership to present at a board work 
session and provide an update on current enrollment at IDEA Allan, attrition since the 
beginning of the school year and a financial assessment. A formal board discussion of the 
partnership was slated for the new board’s December 17th meeting.86 
In another late night board meeting on December 17th, the new Austin board of 
trustees voted 5-4 to end the partnership with IDEA. The majority comprised three new 
board members (Mathias, Hinojosa and Teich) and two existing members who had 
previously voted against the measure. In parallel to the original vote, the meeting was 
standing room only, with approximately 200 people waiting outside to hear the verdict. 
30 community members were invited to address the board, most of them parents and 
students of East Side Memorial High School, as well as other members of the eastside 
community who spoke out against the partnership. In addition to opponents, a group of 
approximately 50 IDEA Allan parents and supporters, many in tears, attended the 
meeting on behalf of the partnership. In ending the partnership, board members stated 
that the issue was too divisive to persist.  New member, Gina Hinojosa stated, “The 
process was so terribly flawed, I’m just not sure we can get past that at this point. At 
some point, so much damage is done, that it’s time for a divorce.”87 
IDEA MOVING FORWARD WITH HINDSIGHT 
With the partnership dissolved, IDEA found itself in a operational and ethical 
quandary. Without the operational support of AISD, the school must either close after a 
single year in operation or find the facilities and funding necessary to move forward as an 
independent entity in Austin.  Larkin Tackett, Executive Director of IDEA Allan, 
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addressed IDEA’s supporters at the December 17th board meeting stating, “We made a 
promise to our students and their families and we’re going to keep that promise. 
Tomorrow our teachers go back to work. Our parents bring our students to school and 
that’s going to last until 2029, when our kindergarteners are going to graduate from 
college.”88 Since the dissolution of the partnership, IDEA has moved forward with its 
plans to develop its program separately from AISD, though at the time of this publication, 
a firm decision on location for the school had not been released.  
 Staff and administrators at IDEA and Austin education professionals involved in 
the partnership have much to say about the lessons learned from the experience. Firstly, 
the business model for an in-district partnership remains compelling, but IDEA will 
likely proceed with considerable caution before entering into another such arrangement. 
The opportunity a partnership presents to gain a competitive advantage over other 
charters is significant—partnership provided IDEA with ready access to facilities, 
students, a talent pool of teachers, and other operational services like food and 
transportation.  However, the partnership also required IDEA to cede considerable 
control. While IDEA stood its ground on some issues, such as its insistence on beginning 
the school model at the elementary level rather than the high school level, it ceded control 
over much of the school’s recruitment and messaging.  
Leaders recognize that the financial attractiveness of the partnership may have 
enticed IDEA to compromise on several of its expansion criteria: in hindsight, Austin 
does not have an ideal setting for sustainability (IDEA’s third criterion) in terms of 
infrastructure for scaling a school and private and philanthropic support. A community 
that is still wary of the school choice movement, Austin is not yet an entirely hospitable 
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environment. Without the partnership opportunity, IDEA may not have settled on Austin 
as an appropriate location for expansion, a reality it now faces as it strives to continue to 
serve its Austin students without the benefits of partnership. The challenges of this 
partnership might have been mitigated with more time.  IDEA and AISD might have 
benefitted from taking a planning year rather than diving immediately into operation.  
Additionally, IDEA might have considered insisting on a contract that expanded beyond 
one year to allow for school operations to take root and demonstrate success before the 
their contract was subject to termination by the new board.  
 In addition, IDEA leaders recognize their lack of understanding of the political 
and social landscape of Austin. Leaders failed to anticipate opposition despite available 
warning flags and underestimated the power of “a few loud voices” to gain support in a 
frustrated community. Relatedly, IDEA leaders now recognize the essential role of 
messaging in its expansion to Austin and its failure to control that process. Engaged in a 
tug of war with AISD over who should respond to community concerns and how, IDEA 
failed to craft a message to counter that of the opposition and engage its target market. In 
hindsight, IDEA leaders recognize the need to more fully understand the Austin 
education consumer. IDEA’s recruitment messages were based on an understanding of 
low-income minority communities in the RGV; leaders realized too late that, while many 
aspects were translatable to Austin, there were significant differences between these 
communities. IDEA leaders wish they had taken the opportunity to answer questions 
fully, clearly, and quickly. The limited charter community in Austin, and a prevalent 
skepticism about these schools meant than many families were simply misinformed about 
what IDEA offered and why. These questions, raised in community forums, in the press, 
and through the opposition groups often went unanswered. The questions felt like attacks 
and IDEA often failed to respond, losing the opportunity to create a brand and reputation. 
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IDEA was surprised to learn that results wouldn’t speak for themselves.  In a new market, 
they were required to communicate more than their graduation statistics and college 
attendance rates to gain trust and generate interest.  
 Finally, in order to successfully engage the community with the sort of 
communication strategy described above, IDEA staff believe they would have benefitted 
from establishing staff and leadership on the ground in Austin much earlier than they did, 






Chapter 4: Critical Analysis and Moving Forward 
This chapter briefly revisits each of the expansion frameworks described in 
Chapter 2, examining each in the context of the IDEA Public Schools expansion to 
Austin. Following these analyses, the author introduces a new framework that 
incorporates the best and most relevant aspects of existing frameworks, as well as new 
elements derived from the IDEA case into a hybrid, cross-sectoral model.  
IDEA PUBLIC SCHOOLS THROUGH THE LENS OF “PORTER’S FIVE FORCES” 
A Five Forces analysis provides a useful, if narrow perspective on IDEA’s 
expansion, focusing on the competitive environment of the Austin education market. 
While several of the forces discussed apply naturally to the case, others require more 
imagination and tweaking to provide insight.  
Threat of Entry  
When considering expansion into Austin, IDEA leaders might have considered 
two scenarios: one in which IDEA partnered with AISD, and one in which it operated 
independently.  From the former perspective, Austin becomes is a very attractive choice 
for expansion, in terms of the Threat of New Entrants or competitors.  By partnering with 
AISD, IDEA would stand to benefit from reduced capital requirements (start-up costs) 
and the economies of scale generated by AISD’s extensive operations in the region, as 
well as a ready-made distribution channel (i.e. a school) through which to reach students. 
Few, if any charters would be viable competitive threats to IDEA if operating in the 
shield of a successful AISD partnership.  
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Power of Suppliers 
Considering the power of suppliers, IDEA leaders might have assessed, in 
particular, the labor supply available to them. Key points of research would include the 
interest level of current, high-performing AISD teachers in teaching at an in-district 
charter school; the availability of a talent pipeline of teachers with applicable training, 
most notably the presence of a Teach for America corps in the area; the attitude of the 
local teacher union toward charter schools in general, and IDEA in particular. This 
research may have lead IDEA to question its labor supply in Austin. While it is hard to 
gauge the interest level of high performing AISD teachers would have had if the 
community response to IDEA had not been so poor, IDEA certainly could have 
anticipated a battle with Education Austin, simply by recognizing that the union was 
creating a competitive plan to develop its own in-district charter. The lack of a Teach for 
America pipeline in Austin might also have been a red flag.  In practice, IDEA drew 
much of its teaching staff from its existing teacher pool in the Rio Grande Valley, a 
viable internal strategy, but one unlikely to boost its image in Austin.  
Power of Buyers 
While the traditional definition of the Power of Buyers is limited in its application 
in this case, a variation on this force might be more relevant. Instead of investigating the 
power of buyers, IDEA might have investigated the “empowerment of buyers” or the 
awareness of their target consumers of the theory of school choice, the school choices 
available to them and the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. Another way to 
consider this would be investigating of the “readiness” of Austin’s eastside community to 
engage in school choice. A thorough investigation of the “empowerment of buyers” 
through community engagement, surveys, focus groups, interviews and the like might 
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have give IDEA’s leadership pause and, if not deterred them, informed the process 
through which they entered the market, shaped their message and recruited students.  
Threat of Substitutes 
The threat of substitutes does not seem to have played a significant role in the 
IDEA case, but may certainly be relevant in other geographic locations. 
Rivalry Among Existing Competitors 
IDEA did investigate the competitive environment in Austin and found there to be 
more cooperation than rivalry among the limited number of charters in the area.  Given 
that these schools were able to meet their enrollment goals without fierce competition and 
maintain waitlists, IDEA found little cause for concern with this force. As IDEA’s entry 
into the Austin market proceeded, this analysis proved accurate.  With one exception 
other charter schools in the area were supportive of IDEA throughout its tumultuous 
entrance into Austin.  
IDEA THROUGH THE LENS OF “SCALING SOCIAL IMPACT” 
The nonprofit model in “Scaling Social Impact” presents a fascinating preliminary 
stage for IDEA and other high performing charters when considering expansion. The first 
step is to identify its innovation and determine whether that innovation exists at the 
organizational level, programmatic level or principle level.  KIPP completed this 
analysis and determined that its innovation was at the principle level. Most high-
performing charters operate as though the innovation exists at the organizational level. 
This may in fact be true, but as this framework suggests, CMO leaders should truly take 
the time to consider that question and justify an answer before proceeding with 
expansion. In my conversations with IDEA leaders, no one was able to identify and 
succinctly describe IDEA’s innovation. They pointed to the core values but 
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acknowledged that those values are reminiscent of the pillars of peer charter 
organizations. While IDEA’s top leadership may have identified this innovation, it does 
not appear to have been clearly defined throughout the organization, limiting its 
usefulness.  
Furthermore, the model dictates that after identifying the organization’s 
innovation, it should proceed through a “Five Rs” analysis to determine which 
mechanism is the appropriate choice for expanding that innovation. Although the model 
identifies just three mechanisms—dissemination, affiliation or branching—the IDEA 
case study presents a 4th mechanism relevant to the charter context: partnership.  
Readiness 
This criterion offers an internal look at organizational readiness, in contrast to the 
external look at market readiness provided by Porter’s Five Forces. IDEA’s success in 
expanding across the Rio Grande Valley answers the first question of this “R:” whether 
there is demonstrable success that isn’t dependent on a specific leader or other 
organizational circumstances. IDEA schools have proliferated across the RGV under a 
variety of school leaders and in a variety of school settings. The second question, whether 
the leader understands what elements of its innovation are required for success, is less 
clear. Certainly, as IDEA negotiated its contract and shaped its message in Austin, a 
better understanding of these concepts would have been valuable.  
Receptivity 
Here we find a particularly relevant question that might have informed IDEA’s 
policy.  Because the IDEA partnership did represent “a radical departure from accepted 
practice”89 in the target community, leaders should have anticipated resistance, according 
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to this model.  This awareness might have informed the mechanism through which IDEA 
wished to spread its innovation—perhaps by licensing a curriculum to AISD rather than 
converting a school, for example—or, alternatively, IDEA might have selected a market 
that was more receptive to IDEA’s preference to expand through branching.   
Resources 
A resource-based perspective of the IDEA expansion would certainly favor the 
plan to partner with AISD, given the wealth of resources—facilities, transportation, food 
service, human capital and even customers—that AISD was able to provide that would 
minimize the financial cost of bringing IDEA into the Austin market.  
Risks 
The risk analysis recommended by Dees et al is very valuable in the IDEA 
context, encouraging leaders to ask, “How likely is it that an innovation will be 
implemented incorrectly or will fail to achieve its intended impact? If this happens, what 
are the potential negative effects on the clients and communities being served?”90 IDEA 
may have benefitted from a close examination of the risk of failure of the partnership and 
what that would mean, not only to the Austin eastside community, but also to its own 
existing customers in the RGV. Loss of trust in AISD and damage to the IDEA reputation 
were significant issues in hindsight.  
Returns 
In the context of risk, IDEA might have also considered returns. This process 
might be in the context of returns to impact, returns to IDEA’s expansion goals or returns 
to IDEA’s reputation. A thorough cost-benefit analysis would require a thorough 
understanding of the organization’s priorities among those three types of return. By 
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understanding the risks and returns of each type entry into Austin’s market (through 
partnership, independent branching, affiliation or branching), IDEA’s leadership might 
take a calculated risk rather than a hopeful leap.  
IDEA THROUGH THE LENS OF “SCALING UP CHARTER MANAGEMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS” 
Given the critiques already presented for this growth model, this analysis 
considers only the criteria presented in this framework that are most relevant to the IDEA 
case.  
Know the Landscape 
This is an area in which IDEA truly suffered. With limited staff on the ground in 
Austin and a lack of savvy about opposition that was likely to arise, IDEA was at a 
disadvantage politically.  Additionally, IDEA administrators acknowledge a failure to 
connect with and engage the families that comprised their target market, and ultimately a 
failure to distinguish their needs and adapt to them.  
Know Who you Are and How to Communicate it 
This is another opportunity for IDEA to improve strategically.  This goal relates 
directly to the recommendation in “Scaling for Social Impact” that the organization must, 
before all else, define its innovation. Identifying, articulating and branding around that 
innovation would provide the foundation of a communications platform for IDEA, 
including a ready response to opposition.  
Money Matters 
Notable in this recommendation is the admonishment to consider any “strings 
attached” before accepting funds.  IDEA leaders have acknowledged that they will take 
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more caution in this in the future, which suggests a wish to have taken more 
consideration of the contract associated with the great resources provided by partnership.  
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR CHARTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION EXPANSION 
Drawing from the strengths of each of the frameworks presented here and from 
analysis of the IDEA case, the following is a comprehensive model from which charter 
school leaders can approach geographic expansion.  It is comprehensive in that it spans 
four phases: pre-expansion, geographic location selection, growth mechanism selection, 
and implementation.  It is comprehensive also in that it draws from the research of 
experts and practitioners across sectors, a logical imperative for an educational movement 
that is defined by merging private and public sector ideas.  In addition to being 
comprehensive, the framework is targeted toward CMOs, with IDEA Public Schools 
serving as a case study for its relevance and applicability.  
Figure 1: A Comprehensive Framework for Strategic CMO Expansion 
 
Phase I: Pre-Expansion 
The first phase of this model, “Pre-Expansion” draws from the recommendation 
of Dees et al that a vital precursor to any CMO expansion is to define its innovation or, in 
other words, have a firm grasp on what defines that organization’s success and how it can 
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be differentiated from other education providers.91 Following that process, the 
organization must be able to articulate that innovation through a clear brand identity that 
will facilitate messaging down the road. 
Phase II: Geographic Selection 
This phase draws from all three models as well as the author’s insights, but 
primarily from Porter’s Five Force. In this phase, the CMO leadership should assess the 
competitive market, considering the threat of entry of new charter schools in the future as 
well as the intensity of rivalry among CMOs and other education providers already 
operating in the market.92 In addition, during this phase leaders should analyze demand, 
considering the threat of substitutes for the target consumers, as well as the “Buyer 
Empowerment” or awareness and readiness of target consumers to engage in school 
choice. This analysis should be considered incomplete without thorough investigation 
into the socio-political history of the geographic region and its cultural impact on the 
target consumer’s receptivity to the specific innovation the school wishes to offer.93 
Finally, in this stage, leaders should engage in a resource assessment of the region, 
including the power of suppliers, most notably labor (teacher) suppliers and the 
availability of diverse funding opportunities.94 
Phase III: Mechanism Selection 
This model draws from the Dees et al assertion that organizations must consider 
the appropriate mechanism for expanding in the context of that organization’s goals and 
strengths. Charters might choose from among the mechanisms described in “Scaling 
Social Impact:” dissemination (merely sharing best practices to enable the growth of 
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other charters in the area); affiliation (i.e. franchising as KIPP has done); or branching (as 
is typical for most high performing charters.95 A fourth mechanism presented in the 
IDEA case is that of partnership, and CMOs may well discover others with thoughtful 
consideration. Importantly, a thorough Phase III analysis will involve a cost-benefit 
analysis of the potential risks and returns associated with each mechanism.  
Phase IV: Implementation 
Finally, expansion planning should continue in the early phases of 
implementation with the CMO leadership deploying staff into the chosen market early to 
both engage with the community and develop a firmer grasp of its needs and socio-
political nuances.  This team should then embark on the process of message development 
in preparation for recruitment.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In an era of heightened social and political scrutiny of the education sector, there 
is a tendency to speed through policy reform, jumping from innovation to innovation with 
high expectations and limited patience for results.  The School Choice Movement spread 
quickly, with charter schools proliferating around the country.  However, criticism of 
charter schools moved just as quickly, inciting an intense debate over the potential of 
these schools to bring about significant improvements in the outcomes of American 
students. At this early stage in the development of charter schools there is limited data to 
argue either case convincingly and a dearth of comprehensive evaluations of the effects 
of school choice. Furthermore, the fragmented nature of the movement has limited the 
development of sound theory from which charter school leaders can draw in developing 
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their school models. These limitations suggest that the potential of charter schools is at 
present, not only unknown, but unknowable. 
This report serves to bolster the growing body of literature of common theoretical 
frameworks and evidence-based best practices with which charter school leaders can 
inform their decision-making. Specifically, the model presented in this report seeks to 
inform strategic expansion of charter schools, a challenge that is central to the question of 
whether school choice can achieve the scale necessary to fundamentally alter the public 
education system. The growth of this theoretical base will serve to optimize the efficiency 
with which charter schools reach their potential, enabling an informed debate about the 
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